Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162436 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 233
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by incomplete information about the costs of providing quality, affect relational contracts in buyer-seller relationships. Under incomplete information, payoffs to actions become private information. This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant. Comparing seller-buyer relationships with and without complete information about seller costs in the laboratory, we find that such a lack of clarity has effects on the terms of relational contracts. However, these effects only concern the distribution of rents, and not efficiency.
Schlagwörter: 
Relational contracts
incomplete information
experiments
JEL: 
D01
D03
L14
L20
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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