Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162433 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 230
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study targeted information in a duopoly model with differentiated products, allowing for consumers with limited attention. The presence of inattentive consumers incentivizes firms to behave as if they were mass-advertisers, despite their ability to direct their messages precisely towards consumers with the strongest preferences. We show that the scope for targeting as an efficient marketing instrument can be severely reduced, for both firms and consumers, if the standard assumption of unbounded attention capacities is dropped. A central insight of our model is that limited attention may explain the recent evidence on increased ad-blocking, which has become a key concern to the entire advertising industry. Our main findings are robust to several variations, including price and salience competition as well as varying quality of the available marketing data.
Schlagwörter: 
Targeting
limited attention
advertising avoidance
salience competition
JEL: 
D43
L13
M37
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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