Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162432
Authors: 
Ewerhart, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 229
Abstract: 
This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic Behavior, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast to the existing solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive characterization. Moreover, its best-response set has the same Hausdorff dimension as its support, which may be seen as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto games.
Subjects: 
Chopstick auction
Exposure problem
Self-similarity
Blotto games
JEL: 
C02
C72
D44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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