Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162413
Authors: 
Benkert, Jean-Michel
Netzer, Nick
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 190
Abstract: 
A nudge is a paternalistic government intervention that attempts to improve choices by changing the framing of a decision problem. We propose a welfare-theoretic foundation for nudging similar in spirit to the classical revealed preference approach, by investigating a model where preferences and mistakes of an agent can be elicited from her choices under different frames. We provide characterizations of the classes of behavioral models for which nudging is possible or impossible, and we derive results on the required quantity of information.
Subjects: 
nudge
framing
behavioral welfare economics
revealed preference
JEL: 
D03
D04
D60
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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