Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162290
Authors: 
Onderstal, Sander
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 17-024/VII
Abstract: 
In a field experiment, we study the revenue-generating properties of premium auctions. In a premium auction, the runner-up obtains a premium for driving up the price paid by the winner. Previous research, both theoretical and in the lab, has shown that the relative performance of premium auctions compared to standard auction formats is context-specific. In the experiment, we compare two types of premium auctions with the standard Vickrey auction selling high-quality, limited-edition posters in an online auction. We observe that neither premium auction raises higher revenue than the Vickrey auction. The variance of the revenue in the Amsterdam auction, one of the premium auctions, is lower than that in the Vickrey auction.
Subjects: 
Premium auctions
field experiment
JEL: 
C93
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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