Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161856
Authors: 
Sahm, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6417
Abstract: 
I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalised Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two main results. First, I specify a sufficient condition on the agents’ comparative prudence under which a higher common level of risk aversion leads to lower aggregate effort in symmetric contests. Second, I show that for a certain range of parameters in asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is comparatively prudent.
Subjects: 
Tullock contest
risk aversion
prudence
JEL: 
C72
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.