Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161850
Authors: 
Bond, Eric
Zissimos, Benjamin
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6411
Abstract: 
We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North.South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare.
Subjects: 
coordination
innovation
patent breadth
patent race
R&D
JEL: 
F02
F13
O30
O31
O32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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