Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161841
Authors: 
Bardey, David
De Donder, Philippe
Mantilla, César
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6402
Abstract: 
We compare two genetic testing regulations, Disclosure Duty (DD) and Consent Law (CL), in an environment where individuals choose to take a genetic test or not. DD forces agents to reveal the test results to their insurers, resulting in a discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an experiment. We obtain that a larger fraction of agents test under CL than under DD, and that the proportion of individuals preferring CL to DD is non-monotone in the test cost when adverse selection is set endogenously at its steady state level.
Subjects: 
consent law
disclosure duty
personalized medicine
test take up rate
pooling health insurance contracts
JEL: 
C91
D82
I18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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