Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161837
Authors: 
Cohn, Alain
Fehr, Ernst
Maréchal, Michel André
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6398
Abstract: 
In recent years, the banking industry has witnessed several cases of excessive risk-taking that frequently have been attributed to problematic professional norms. We conduct experiments with employees from several banks in which we manipulate the saliency of their professional identity and subsequently measure their risk aversion in a real stakes investment task. If bank employees are exposed to professional norms that favor risk-taking, they should become more willing to take risks when their professional identity is salient. We find, however, that subjects take significantly less risk, challenging the view that the professional norms generally increase bank employees’ willingness to take risks.
Subjects: 
risk culture
banking industry
experiment
JEL: 
G02
M14
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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