Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/161485 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2016/101
Verlag: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government's taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralized with decentralized governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by interest groups trying to affect government taxation decisions. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of decentralization in taxation decisions.
Schlagwörter: 
governance
decentralization
economic-models-of-political-processes
contests
rent-seeking
intergovernmental-relation
JEL: 
H77
D72
H73
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-145-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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