Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161383
Authors: 
Inukai, Keigo
Kawata, Keisuke
Sasaki, Masaru
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10760
Abstract: 
The paper develops a committee search model with ex-ante heterogeneous agents and designs laboratory experiments to test theoretical predictions. In the theoretical part of the study, there exists one and only one pivotal voter, who can perfectly and dominantly control the voting results of the committee search activities. The most important prediction is that nonpivotal voters become less picky in committee search than in single-agent search, but that a pivotal voter's voting behavior remains unchanged, regardless of the type of voting rules for the search. However, our experimental results did not support this prediction; not only the nonpivotal voters but also the pivotal voter became less picky in the committee search games. In addition, we found gender differences in voting behavior; females show more concern for other group members' payoff as well as themselves than do males.
Subjects: 
experiments
committee search
plurality voting rules
JEL: 
C91
D72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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