Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161223
Authors: 
Buraimo, Babatunde
Bryson, Alex
Simmons, Rob
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10600
Abstract: 
That football Head Coaches will be dismissed for poor performance and will quit when they have better outside options seems to be nothing more than a statement of the obvious. But owners may find it hard to distinguish poor performance from bad luck and may find it difficult to identify and attract talented managers from other clubs. Indeed, most of the literature indicates little improvement in team performance when one coach replaces another. Equally, Head Coaches may have few options to move to better clubs even when they are performing well. We identify significant differences between determinants of quits and dismissals that are largely consistent with a standard model which predicts departures occur when the value of the job match specific surplus for one or both parties falls below the value of outside options. However, dismissals and quits are more common in Italy and Spain than in Germany and France, suggesting institutions may be important. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of principal-agent theory and the wider literature on turnover among CEOs and other corporate leaders.
Subjects: 
quits
dismissals
layoffs
managerial performance
team performance
football
survival analysis
competing risks
JEL: 
J23
J24
J63
J64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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