Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/161170 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10547
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide evidence that promotion incentives influence the effort of public employees by studying China's system of promotions for teachers. Predictions from a tournament model of promotion are tested using retrospective panel data on primary and middle school teachers. Consistent with theory, high wage increases for promotion are associated with better performance, teachers increase effort in years leading up to promotion eligibility, and reduce effort if they are repeatedly passed over for promotion. Evaluation scores are positively associated with teacher time use and with student test scores, diminishing concerns that evaluations are manipulated.
Schlagwörter: 
teacher incentives
promotions
China
JEL: 
J31
J33
J45
M51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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