Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161150
Authors: 
Roff, Jennifer Louise
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10527
Abstract: 
Previous literature has established that unilateral divorce laws may reduce female household work. As shown by Stevenson (2007), unilateral divorce laws may affect overall marital investment. In addition, if unilateral divorce has differential costs by gender, then unilateral divorce may impact household work by gender through bargaining channels. However, little research has examined how divorce laws may affect males' household production and the gender distribution of household work. To examine this issue, I use data on matched couples from the PSID and exploit variation over time in state divorce laws. This research indicates that unilateral divorce laws lead to a decrease in marital investment, as measured by both males and females' household work. The evidence also supports a bargaining response to divorce laws, as fathers in states without joint custody laws show a significantly higher share of household work with unilateral divorce than those in states with joint custody laws, consistent with a relatively higher cost of marital dissolution among fathers who stand to lose custody of their children.
Subjects: 
divorce law
household bargaining
marriage
JEL: 
J12
J22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
855.9 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.