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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10497
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader's gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly-selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams with elected leaders coordinate on higher effort levels. Initially, the benefits of being elected are enjoyed solely by male leaders. However, this gender difference disappears with repeated interaction as unsuccessful male leaders are reelected more often than unsuccessful female leaders.
Schlagwörter: 
gender differences
leadership
democracy effect
leader effectiveness
coordination
JEL: 
M14
M54
J16
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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