Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161120
Authors: 
Reuben, Ernesto
Timko, Krisztina
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10497
Abstract: 
We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader's gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly-selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams with elected leaders coordinate on higher effort levels. Initially, the benefits of being elected are enjoyed solely by male leaders. However, this gender difference disappears with repeated interaction as unsuccessful male leaders are reelected more often than unsuccessful female leaders.
Subjects: 
gender differences
leadership
democracy effect
leader effectiveness
coordination
JEL: 
M14
M54
J16
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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