Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161019
Authors: 
Afridi, Farzana
Dhillon, Amrita
Solan, Eilon
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10396
Abstract: 
In developing countries with weak institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on elections to instill norms of accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when political competition is too high or too low. We first build a simple game theoretic model to capture the effect of electoral competition on corruption. We show that in equilibrium, corruption has a U-shaped relationship with electoral competition. If the election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher, and for intermediate levels of competition, corruption is lower. We also predict that when there are different types of corruption, then incumbents increase corruption in the components that voters care less about regardless of competition. We test the model's predictions using data gathered on audit findings of leakages from a large public program in Indian villages belonging to the state of Andhra Pradesh during 2006-10 and on elections to the village council headship in 2006. Our results largely confirm the theoretical results that competition has a non-linear effect on corruption, and that the impact of electoral competition varies by whether theft is from the public or private component of the service delivery. Overall, our results suggest that over-reliance on elections to discipline politicians is misplaced.
Subjects: 
audit
electoral competition
corruption
social accountability
JEL: 
D72
D82
H75
O43
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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