Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159929
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1091
Abstract: 
We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of a linear Cournot game. We illustrate the existence of the stick-and-carrot globally optimal punishment for large cartels, and fully characterise it. Then, we show that for mall cartels, global optimality may be reached only with two-period punishments.
JEL: 
C73
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
587.3 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.