Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159882
Authors: 
Benassi, Corrado
Chirco, Alessandra
Colombo, Caterina
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1044
Abstract: 
The paper proves the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a vertically differentiated duopoly with uncovered market, for a large set of symmetric and asymmetric distributions of consumers, including, among others, all logconcave distributions. The proof relies on the 'income share elasticity' representation of the consumers' density function, which ensures the analytical tractability of the firms' optimality conditions at a high level of generality. Some illustrative examples of the solution are offered, in order to assess the impact of distributive shocks on the equilibrium market configuration.
JEL: 
L13
L11
D43
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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