Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159871
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Delbono, Flavio
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1033
Abstract: 
In a Cournot duopoly, if only one firm hires a manager while the other remains entrepreneurial, the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium emerges, with the managerial firm as the leader. This happens under at least three different delegation schemes. We illustrate the different meachanisms driving this outcome through the analysis of the map of best replies at the market stage.
JEL: 
D43
L13
L21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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