Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159852
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1014
Abstract: 
In this note we revisit the result by Menezes and Quiggin (2012), showing that under linear supply function competition, the same Nash equilibrium results when arms choose slopes or intercepts of their supply functions. This is because the first order conditions emerging in the two strategy spaces are not linearly independent.
JEL: 
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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