Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159851
Authors: 
Castellani, Massimiliano
Fanelli, Luca
Savioli, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1013
Abstract: 
To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregressive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run cointegration relationships are interpreted as the players' reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the effectiveness of government and labour union strategies.
JEL: 
E62
J51
C72
C54
C32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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