Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159832
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 994
Abstract: 
Within a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. For price setting entails a continuum of price equilibria under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost pricing may be observed. As a consequence, Bertrand-Nash equilibrium profits (welfare) may be higher (lower) than Cournot-Nash ones. The reversal of the standard rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive behaviour.
JEL: 
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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