Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159810
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 972
Abstract: 
Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow to credibly deter tacit collusion.
JEL: 
H13
L13
L32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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