Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159805
Authors: 
Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo
Lisciandra, Maurizio
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 967
Abstract: 
This analysis investigates a political corruption model that builds on previous literature on corruption in hierarchies. Our study enriches the literature on political corruption emphasizing the contrasting role of the minorities having a control role of the majorities. In particular, this paper provides a set-up for the conditions in which a briber can choose between either bribing only the majority and accepting the monitoring of the minority, or alternatively, bribing also the minority, which gives up to its control role and increases the probability of success of the illicit action. Minorities can exploit their typical monitoring role in modern democracies either to gain a reputational premium or to get involved in bribing and raising higher stakes. Thus, policy-makers face a sort of paradox when attempting to strengthen the control role of minorities and reduce corrupt behavior because this may cause the opposite effect of inducing the minorities to get involved into the illicit activity and, eventually, spread the corruption disease.
JEL: 
D72
D73
K42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
409.94 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.