Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159801
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 962
Abstract: 
We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. The type of firms we focus on is workers' cooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment-constrained profit maximisers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately efficient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially efficient if market size is large enough, including the case of merger to monopoly.
JEL: 
D43
L13
L21
L41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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