Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159793 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 954
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We revisit the relationship between market power and firms' investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game in which firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules, and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, provided product differentiation is sufficiently high. Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition.
JEL: 
C73
L13
M37
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
352.51 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.