Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159793 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 954
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We revisit the relationship between market power and firms' investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game in which firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules, and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, provided product differentiation is sufficiently high. Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition.
JEL: 
C73
L13
M37
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
352.51 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.