Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159793
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Zaccour, Georges
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 954
Abstract: 
We revisit the relationship between market power and firms' investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game in which firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules, and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, provided product differentiation is sufficiently high. Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition.
JEL: 
C73
L13
M37
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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