Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159768
Authors: 
Feichtinger, Gustav
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
Wrzaczek, Stefan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 929
Abstract: 
We extend a well known differential oligopoly game to encompass the possibility for production to generate a negative environmental externality, regulated through Pigouvian taxation and price caps. We show that, if the price cap is set so as to fix the tolerable maximum amount of emissions, the resulting equilibrium investment in green R&D is indeed concave in the structure of the industry. Our analysis appears to indicate that inverted-U-shaped investment curves are generated by regulatory measures instead of being a "natural" feature of firms' decisions.
JEL: 
C73
L13
O31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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