Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159731 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 892
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we develop a model in which students choose their university coursework based on both investment and consumption incentives. We show that these education decisions are socially inefficient. This result is driven by the fact that students do not consider an externality in the working environment of acquiring education for investment purposes. We show when and how it is possible to design tuition fees in such a way that students acquire the socially optimal level of education.
JEL: 
D62
H21
I21
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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