Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159731
Authors: 
Romano, Richard
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 892
Abstract: 
In this paper we develop a model in which students choose their university coursework based on both investment and consumption incentives. We show that these education decisions are socially inefficient. This result is driven by the fact that students do not consider an externality in the working environment of acquiring education for investment purposes. We show when and how it is possible to design tuition fees in such a way that students acquire the socially optimal level of education.
JEL: 
D62
H21
I21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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