Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159727 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 888
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal property in one case and private property in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists a norm of investment and a norm of surplus division must coevolve. While the investment norm always supports the efficient investment profile, the surplus division norm may differ among these games depending on the size of investment cost gap. Under private property only the egalitarian surplus division evolves. Under communal property instead two different surplus division norms may evolve: the egalitarian one and an inegalitarian norm. We show that no cap to payoffs inequality emerges under private property while an inequality payoff cap endogenously evolves under communal property. The games have been proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.
JEL: 
C78
D83
L14
Z13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
499.79 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.