Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159700 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 861
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
Can a bank increase its profit by subsidizing inactivity? This paper suggests this may occur, due to the presence of hidden information, in a monopolistic credit market. Rather than offering credit in a pooling contract, a monopolist bank can sort borrowers through an appropriate subsidy to inactivity. Under some conditions, sorting may avoid the collapse of the market and increases the welfare of everybody. The bank increases its profits, good borrowers benefit from lower interest rates and bad potential borrowers from the subsidy. The subsidy policy however implies a cross subsidy between contracts and this is possible only under monopoly.
JEL: 
D60
D82
H71
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Dokumentart: 
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