Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159695
Authors: 
Dragone, Davide
Lambertini, Luca
Palestini, Arsen
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 856
Abstract: 
We revisit the debate on the optimal number of firms in the commons in a differential oligopoly game in which firms are either quantity-or price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of firms maximising industry profits, finding that it is larger in the Cournot case. While industry structure is always inefficient under Bertrand behaviour, it may or may not be so under Cournot behaviour, depending on parameter values. The comparison of private industry optima reveals that the Cournot steady state welfare level exceeds the corresponding Bertrand magnitude if the weight of the stock of pollution is large enough.
JEL: 
C73
L13
Q20
Q51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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