Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159686
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 847
Abstract: 
We propose a model of environmental overcompliance in a duopoly setting where consumers are environmentally concerned and may patronise the product they buy, firms set their green investment to abate the impact of productivity on pollution and a government sets the environmental standard with the aim to maximise welfare. We show that, with no patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral by the firm with higher quality standard under Bertrand behaviour, whereas both firms may overcomply under Cournot competition if the environmental impact of production is sufficiently low. Conversely with patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral with low environmental impact of production under price competition, and both firm overcomply under quantity competition.
JEL: 
L13
L51
Q50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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