Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159646
Authors: 
Kopel, Michael
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 807
Abstract: 
We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to those affecting the stability of price cartels.
JEL: 
C73
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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