Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159635
Authors: 
Bigoni, Maria
Casari, Marco
Skrzypacz, Andrzej
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 796
Abstract: 
When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon is deterministic rather than stochastic. Moreover, a deterministic duration generates different aggregate patterns and individual strategies than a stochastic one. For instance, under a deterministic horizon subjects show high initial cooperation and a strong end-of-period reversal to defection. Moreover, they do not learn to apply backward induction but to postpone defection closer to the end.
JEL: 
C72
C73
C91
C92
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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