Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159634
Authors: 
Andergassen, Rainer
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 795
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards.
JEL: 
L1
J33
O31
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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