Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159611
Authors: 
Blasco, Andrea
Pin, Paolo
Sobbrio, Francesco
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 772
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a two-sided market for news where advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information about the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information about the quality of their competitors' products (paying positive to go negative). We show that whether or not advertisers have negative consequences on the accuracy of news reports ultimately depends on the extent of correlation among advertisers' products. Specifically, the lower is the correlation among the qualities of the advertisers' products, the (weakly) higher is the accuracy of the media outlet' reports. Moreover, when advertisers' products are correlated, a higher degree of competition in the market of the advertisers' products may decrease the accuracy of the media outlet's reports.
JEL: 
L82
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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