Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159602 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 763
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
It is still an open question when groups will perform better than individuals in intellectual tasks. We report that in a company takeover experiment, groups placed better bids than individuals and substantially reduced the winner's curse. This improvement was mostly due to peer pressure over the minority opinion and to group learning. Learning took place from interacting and negotiating consensus with others, not simply from observing their bids. When there was disagreement within a group, what prevailed was not the best proposal but the one of the majority. Groups underperformed with respect to a "truth wins" benchmark although they outperformed individuals deciding in isolation.
JEL: 
C91
C92
D03
D81
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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