Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159593
Authors: 
Bigoni, Maria
Fort, Margherita
Nardotto, Mattia
Reggiani, Tommaso
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 752
Abstract: 
This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students' effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.
JEL: 
A22
C93
I20
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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