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Autoren: 
Camera, Gabriele
Casari, Marco
Bigoni, Maria
Datum: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 751
Zusammenfassung: 
Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner's dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions.
JEL: 
C70
C90
D80
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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