Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159591
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 750
Abstract: 
We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leaders role.
JEL: 
C73
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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