Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159590
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 749
Abstract: 
We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.
JEL: 
L13
L51
Q50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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