Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159588
Authors: 
Esfahani, Hamideh
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 747
Abstract: 
In this paper, we investigate the profitability of horizontal mergers of firms with price adjustments. We take a differential game approach and both the open-loop as well as the closed-loop equlibria are considered. We show that the merger incentive is determined by how fast the price adapts to the equilibrium level.
JEL: 
C73
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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