Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159583
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 742
Abstract: 
I investigate a two-country non cooperative game where the status quo ante is asymmetric as one country is endowed with nuclear weapons while the other is not and is evaluating the opportunity of build up a nuclear arsenal. After identifying the conditions on payoffs such that the resulting reduced form is a coordination game with two symmetric equilibria, I resort to forward induction to show that the implicit signaling mechanism in it may lead countries to select the peaceful equilibrium in a symmetric environment where both are endowed with analogous arsenals.
JEL: 
C72
F50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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