Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159582 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 741
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We propose a simple method for characterising analytically the feedback solution of oligopoly games with capital accumulation à la Solow-Swan. As a result, it becomes possible to contrast the feedback equilibrium against the corresponding one generated by open-loop information. Our method accommodates extensions of the stripped down oligopoly model in several directions. As an example, we expand the setup to include environmental effects and Pigouvian taxation.
JEL: 
C73
L13
Q55
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
445.05 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.