Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159570
Authors: 
Fadaee, Mehdi
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 729
Abstract: 
Acquired wisdom has it that the allocation of pollution rights to firms hinders their willingness to undertake uncertain R&D projects for environmental-friendly technologies. We revisit this issue in a model where firms strategically choose whether to participate in an auction to attain pollution permits, or instead invest in green R&D, to show that, somewhat counterintuitively, a side effect of the auction is in fact that of fostering environmental R&D in an admissible range of the model parameters.
JEL: 
L13
Q55
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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