Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159540
Authors: 
Fedele, Alessandro
Mantovani, Andrea
Liucci, Francesco
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 699
Abstract: 
In this paper we consider a moral hazard problem between a creditworthy firm which needs funding and a bank. We first study under which conditions the firm does not obtain the loan. We then determine whether and how the intervention of an external financial institution can facilitate the access to credit. In particular, we focus on the European Investment Bank Group (EIBG), which provides (i) specific credit lines to help banks that finance small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)and (ii) guarantees for portfolios of SMEs'loans. We show that only during crises the EIBG intervention allows to totally overcome the credit crunch.
JEL: 
G01
D82
D21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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